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A PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE INSANITY PLEA-CLUES
TO THE PROBLEMS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND INSANITY IN THE DEATH CELL*
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIGt
As a judge I used to feel ill at ease in criminal cases when the law tempted
me to rely on a psychiatrist's opinion as to the "sanity" of an accused who
had otherwise been proved guilty of a criminal act. I knew only too well that
the psychiatrist, whom the law compelled to give an answer to my ambiguous
question, found his comfort in the thought that it was I, not he, who ultimately
passed judgment. Scholars and judges throughout the world, to whom this
mutual "trust" has appeared as a frivolous game of ping-pong, have sought to
improve understanding between the two professions in terms of new formulas
of communication. But all these new formulLs failed and, I submit, will con-
tinue to fail. The game played by judge and psychiatrist will continue because
the question we lawyers seek to formulate for the psychiatrist is one we really
do not mean to ask. We do not really want to learn whether the accused or
condemned man was or is "insane" in any accepted or acceptable sense of the
word. Rather, we hope the psychiatrist will resolve for us the question whether
the offender's punishment is preferable to his release. But that question neither
the lawyer nor the psychiatrist can answer until we know why we punish.
A rational answer to this question would require the weighing of such con-
flicting factors as the victim's, the offender's and, most important, society's
conscious and subconscious wishes and interests. Neither the judge nor the
psychiatrist is willing or indeed able to do that weighing. Since the judge is
not prepared to forego -the psychiatrist's help in this impossible task, the judge
must misstate his question so as to make it acceptable to the psychiatrist. And
since the psychiatrist is not prepared to refuse his help to the judge in this
impossible task, the psychiatrist must misstate his answer so as to make it
acceptable to the judge. While the judge phrases his insanity test in pseudo-
medical language, the psychiatrist phrases his findings in pseudo-legal lan-
guage. Inescapable reasons of mass psychology are likely to perpetuate this
conundrum, for one of the factors determining the issue between punishment
and release has always been, and is likely to remain, irrational: namely, so-
ciety's urge for retributory vengeance.
To be sure, the intensity and visible impact of this urge have varied from
time to time and crime to crime. Indeed, growing scientific insight and social
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maturity have in limited areas-as in the treatment of juvenile delinquents
and certain deviants--occasionally resulted in a planning of societal action
relatively unencumbered by irrational factors, and have thus opened new fields
of fruitful cooperation between the medical and the legal profession. But out-
side these limited areas, many measures, praised as progress toward greater
rationality and kindness, have failed to take account of fundamental roots of
social behavior by positing a capacity of self-denial which society does not
possess. Consequently, many "progressive" measures have been either frus-
trated or re-formed into ancient patterns. Such revolutionary experiments as
that of Mexico and early Soviet Russia, purporting to replace all criminal
sanction by measures designed to reform the offender or to secure society,
have been either expressly or impliedly abandoned. Yet, similar schemes con-
tinue to be offered as panaceas. Broad formulas that invite acquittal of "in-
sane" criminals with a view to subjecting them to compulsory "cure," and
schemes for the "expert" curative sentencing of convicted offenders have been
outgrowths of that trend.' Although such measures might avoid hardship in an
individual case, more often they have proved or are likely to prove to be little
more than new outlets for social' aggression. Because of this overlap between
"punishment" and "cure," all references to "punishment" in this article must
be understood as including acquittals followed by compulsory "cure. ' '9
Because of the irrationality inherent in all punishment, including convic-
tions and such acquittals, the discrepancy between legal and medical concern
and language is likely to continue. However possible and desirable collabora-
tion between the professions be as to other common tasks, a reconciliation,
let alone an alliance, between the lawyer and the physician is likely to remain
impossible as to the formulation of the crucial question of legal insanity. In-
deed, coordination of the lawyer's and the physician's judgment may not even
be desirable. The sense of justice, like the feeling for beauty, is affected by
many irrational factors. If the painter and his critic were able to analyze and
to restate to the jury its subconscious reactions, the jury's members would
find it most difficult to guard their own responses against distortion. On
similar grounds, we must protect the jury which is to pass on guilt and sanity
against pseudo-rational distortions of its own responses. What we may and
should strive for in this respect is an understanding of this fact in order to
avoid such harm as may be caused by "scientific" delusions. This understand-
ing will not be assisted by the use of any general formula. But it can perhaps
be prepared by a "psychoanalysis" of the societal functions of the insanity
plea itself.
The definition of legal insanity, like that of all legal concepts, depends on
its specific purpose. We all recognize that legal insanity means different things
1. See text at notes 52-54 infra.
2. Cf. Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961), re''d, 369 U.S. 705
(1962). See also infra notes 8, 52.
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according to whether it relates to annulment or divorce,3 to contract 4 or
tort,6 to wills 6 or criminal conduct. It will be shown that as to criminal con-
duct we must again distinguish according to the prevailing purpose of the
desired definition, and that, therefore, legal insanity may mean different things
in prosecutions for murder, rape and larceny, and at the various stages of the
criminal process.
Legal insanity may be claimed as of the time of the deed, the time of the
trial and sentencing, and the time of punishment. I shall not say much about
insanity at the time of trial and sentence. Jury, psychiatrist and court will
decide that question by the simple test of whether or not they consider the
accused able to take part in the trial and reasonably to defend himself.7 Nor
shall I say much about the treatment of the insanity problem when the man
has been convicted and is serving a prison term. He can and often will be
treated as a sick person the same way as if he suffered from some physical
3. See Williams v. Williams, [1963] 3 Weekly L.R. 215 (House of Lords); Good-
hart, Cruelty, Desertion and Insanity in Matrimonial Law, 79 L.Q. REv. 98 (1963); Gutt-
macher & Weihofen, Mental Incompetency, 36 MINN. L. REv. 179, 202 (1952); Hayes,
Mental Disease and the Ecclesiastical Courts, 16 JuRiST 267 (1956) ; Annot., 24 A.L.R.
2d 873 (1952). Mezer & Rheingold, Mental Capacity and Incompetency: A Psycho-legal
Problem, 118 Am. J. PSYCH.ATRY 827-28 (1962), list 31 legal areas involving a potential-
ly differing medical judgment of incompetency. See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDA-
TION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (Lindman & McIntyre ed. 1961).
4. 2 WILLSTON, CoNTRAcTs § 256 (3d ed. Jaeger 1959); Guttmacher & Weihofen,
supra note 3, at 186; Green, Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency, 6 Mo. L. REv. 141, 146
(1941); Notes, 35 CAN. B. REv. 205 (1957); 29 TENN. L. REv. 274 (1962); 29 TEMP.
L.Q. 380 (1956).
5. PRossa, TORTS 791 (2d ed. 1955) ; Guttmacher & Weihofen, supra note 3, at 209.
See also Anderson, Insanity as a Defense to the Civil Fraud Penalty, 1963 DunE L.J.
428.
6. Guttmacher & Weihofen, supra note 3, at 196; Green, supra note 4, at 152; Usdin,
The Psychiatrist and Testamentary Capacity, 32 TUr.. L. R.xv. 89 (1957). But see, e.g.,
Anderson v. Grasburg, 247 Minn. 538, 78 N.W.2d 450 (1956) (criminal law test used in
denying a constructive trust) and Note, 41 MINN. L. REv. 334 (1957).
7. See STATE OF CAIFOR-NIA, SPECIAL COMfISSIONS ON INSANITY AND CRIMINAL
OFFENDERS, FIRST REPORT 57 (1962); Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial:
Procedures, Results, and Problems, 119 Am. J. PsYcHIATRY 713 (1963). Future psycho-
analytical research might discover that even at this stage our test of sanity cannot be
wholly rational. We may find that society uses--or abuses-the trial in part as a curative,
to strengthen the egos of both the accused and the spectator, and that the trial of an in-
sane individual lacking a "fighting chance" would be without attraction and effect. For
a significant example of medical ambivalence to the so-called Ganser syndrome, the de-
terioration of the accused's mental state prior to trial, see SzASz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL
ILLNESS 250-51 (1961). Perhaps the best recent analysis of the problem is Slovenko,
Psychiatry, Criminal Law, and the Role of the Psychiatrist, 1963 Duxx L.J. 395, 410-16,
an article that unfortunately appeared too late to be fully exploited in the present paper.
On the psychological meaning of litigation in general, see Redmount, Psychological Views
in Jurisprudential Theories, 107 U. PA. L. Rnv. 472, 510-11 (1959).
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illness. Here our psychiatrists are free and welcome to use their own science
and their own insanity test without interference by the law.8 -
But in two respects the problem of legal insanity is completely unsolved
and here I believe our present efforts are unavailing because we have not
sufficiently analyzed the job we have to do. What I am referring to is the
defense of legal insanity at the time of the crime, most important and quite
crucial for our administration of criminal justice and the execution of insane
persons, perhaps less important, but even more dramatic.
The Ping-Pong Match: Court and Psychiatrist
Under the M'Naghten test as now generally applied, the accused is deemed
to have been sane at the time of his alleged crime if he knew the nature and
quality of his act, and also knew that his act was wrong. This formula, estab-
lished by the House of Lords more than a century ago,9 has replaced a long
series of others, such as Bracton's "wild beast" test 10 of the 13th century, the
"twenty pence" test of the 16th century (under which anybody who could
count 20 pence and knew his father and mother was held criminally respon-
sible), and the "child of fourteen" test of one hundred years later. We smile
at these formulas, but are we doing better today? Psychiatrists do not think
so. M'Naghten, they say, is based on "antiquated and outworn medical and
ethical concepts." It is "hoary, old legal dogma," or at least "unintelligible.""
And they are unhappy about being asked questions by the court to which their
science has no answers. 1 2 Do we call insane one who fails to recognize as a
8. The problem seems to be a rare one in actual practice because prisoners are reluc-
tant to seek commitment. "Apparently the terrors of bedlam exceed those of prison. .. .
Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 381, 382 (1962). See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 712, 724 (1962) ; GuTr-
MACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 414 (1952).
9. The Queen v. M'Naghten, 10 Cl. and F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (House of Lords,
1843). For a history of the case, see CALIFORNIA REPORT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 74-75.
10. I am indebted to Dr. Bernhard Diamond, Berkeley, for his comment that this
test was never part of the English law of insanity but, as now stated, is the result of a
mistranslation of the Latin word "brutis" as referring to wild beasts rather than irra-
tional beings.
11. HALL, GENERAL PRINCILES OF CRIMINAL LAW 472-74 (2d ed. 1960), quoting
from writings of White, Overholster and Zilboorg. See also Ebaugh & Macdonald, The
MedLcolegal Dilemma-An Interment of Truth, 184 J.A.M.A. 131 (1963).
12. From the boundless literature on this subject, see AMRICAN BAR FOUNDATION,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 330-47 (Lindman & McIntyre ed. 1961);
GLUECIC, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: COLD WAR OR ENTENTE CORDIALE? (1962); BERGLER,
JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE 117-22 (1963); Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and
Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. Rrv. 189 (1962); PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW (1957); GLUECK,
MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925); ABRAHAMSEN, CRIME AND THE
HUMAN MIND (1944); OvERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW (1953); WEI-
HOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954) ; GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1952); Hall & Menninger, Book Review, 38 IowA L. REv.
687 (1953); Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 336
(1955). See also, e.g., Williams, The Royal Commission and the Defense of Insanity,
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"wrong" what was wrong by the standards of his community, or only what
was wrong by his own standards? If the latter, any error should negate crim-
inal responsibility (which we make depend on the faculty not the fact of cog-
nition). Or is it enough if the accused was aware of the ethical wrongness of
his act, though he thought it legally unobjectionable?
But the psychiatrist would not be satisfied even if we could give him a
definition of the "wrongness" in M'Naghten. For, he will ask, what does that
wrongness have to do with his expert knowledge of mental disease? More-
over, regard for the accused's "total personality" requires inclusion in the test
of elements other than those related to his intellect. The Durham test was
devised in response to these and other complaints to replace M'Naghten
which, it is generally agreed, has hardly ever been given more than lip ser-
vice.13 Now the psychiatrist need tell us only whether a mental disease pro-
duced the accused's criminal act.14 Does this test solve our problem? Most
courts do not think so.' 5 To be sure, great strides have been made in medical
science as to the origin, diagnosis, and cure of mental illness. But how can,
and why should, such new findings help us in determining the ultimate issue
whether or not an accused should be punished? The sickest may most splen-
CuRRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 16 (1954); Morris, Committee Report, 21 MODERN L. REv.
63 (1958). For a bibliography, see TOMPXINS, IN sANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAvW
(1960).
13. CALIFORNIA REPORT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 24.
14. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See, e.g., DONNELLY,
GoLDsTEIN & ScHwARTz, CRIMINA. LAw 739-810 (1962); Symposium, Insanity and the
Criminal Law-A Critique of Durham v. United States, 22 U. CI. L. REv. 317 (1955);
Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham, and Beyond,
41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955) ; Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761
(1956). See also ME. REv. STAT. Ch. 149, § 38-A (Cum. Supp. 1961); Note, 15 ME. L.
REv. 107 (1963). Cf. Blocker v. United States, 288 F2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Raab, A
Moralist Looks at the Durham and M'Naghten Rules, 46 MINN. L. REv. 327 (1961);
Reid, Criminal Insanity and Psychiatric Evidence: The Challenge of Blocker, 8 How.
L.J. 1 (1962).
15. On the near-general rejection of the Durham test, see CALIrORNIA REPORT, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 79; PaaxZs, CRIMINAL LAW 763-65 (1957) ; Notes, 45 CALm'. L. REv.
538 (1957); 45 GEo. L.J. 516 (1957); 15 ME. L. REv. 107 n.5 (1963). On August 12,
1963, the House of Representatives passed a bill that would abolish the test in the District
of Columbia where it was created. 109 CoNG. REc. 13948, 13957 (1963). On the prob-
able psychological basis of this rejection, see Watson, A Critique of the Legal Approach
to Crime and Correction, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 611 (1958). But see Douglas, The
Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 41 IowA L. REv. 485
(1956); Note, 11 VAnx. L. REv. 218 (1957). On the modification of the Durham rule by
the court of its origin in McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962), see
Acheson, McDonald v. United States: The Durham Rule Redefined, 51 GEo. L.J. 580
(1963). On the ambiguity of the medical concept of insanity, see Swartz, "Mental Dis-
ease": The Groundwork for Legal Analysis and Legislative Action, 111 U. PA. L. REv.
389 (1963). See also Fox, Physical Disorder, Consciousness, and Criminal Liability, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 645 (1963) ; Ibanez, Bridging the Gap on Concepts of Mental Illness,
Crim. L.Q., Feb. 1963, p. 23; Slovenko, supra note 7, at 400-02.
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didly respond to criminal punishment, while the sanest might not. Punishment
of the sick may be a deterrent as effective as punishment of the sane. And
most crucial, even if the existence of mental disease had a close relation to the
impact of punishment, would society be able and willing to make its right
to exact punishment depend on this impact?
The ultimate question-whether to punish or not-remains unanswered also
in the most recent attacks on the problem: the Model Penal Code of the
American Law Institute, which combines the "product" test of the Durham
rule with a relic of M'Naghten (lack of "substantial capacity either to appre-
ciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct") ;16 and the
Currens rule 17 which, partly following the New Hampshire rule,' s omits
"capacity to appreciate" and abandons the "product" test, but continues to
look for the "result" of mental illness and for the accused's "capacity to con-
form." Our question remains equally unanswered under such older com-
promise solutions as the theory of partial responsibility, 9 or the doctrine of
irresistible impulse.20 They cannot be given more credit than as expressions
of a society whose bad conscience is anxious to mitigate at least some of the
hardship it feels impelled to impose.21
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), almost literally
identical with the rule of the German Penal Code. STRAFGESETZBRUCH, KOmSmSENTAR § 51
(11th ed. Sch~nke-Schr6der 1963). See also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 592 (Cum. Supp.
1962); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (1958); Allen, The Rule of the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code, 45 MARQ. L. Rv. 494 (1962). Cf. Hall, Mental Disease
and Criminal Responsibility-McNaghten Versus Durham and the American Law In-
stitute's Tentative Draft, 33 IND. L.J. 212 (1958) ; Kuh, The Insanity Defense-An Effort
to Combine Law and Reason, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 771, 796-801 (1962); Kuh, A Prose-
cutor Considers the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 608, 624-27 (1963).
17. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). See generally CALIFORNIA
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 17-19, 85-86; Slovenko, supra note 7, at 402-03.
18. See State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 382, 393 (1871). See also Reid, Understanding
the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 69 YALE L.J. 367 (1960); Reid,
Companion of the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 15 VAND. L. REv. 721
(1962) ; CALIFORNIA REPORT, op. cit. mipra note 7, at 18-19, 77-78.
19. See GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: COLD WAR OR ENTENTE CORDIALE? (1962);
Address by Hall. The Purposes of a System for the Administration of Criminal Justice,
E. D. White Lecture, Georgetown Univ., Oct. 9, 1963; Diamond, supra note 12, at 203;
PERKINS, CRimIxAL LAw 767 (1957); GLuECK, CRILM AND CoRREcTIoN 159 (1952);
Weihofen, Partial Insanity and Criminal Intent, 24 ILL. L. REv. 505 (1930); Note, 43
CoRNELL L.Q. 283 (1957). Scottish law has long recognized "diminished responsibility."
See Smith, Diminished Responsibility, 4 Cltm. L. REv. (ExG.) 354 (1957). For conti-
nental law, see, e.g., WEGNER, STRAFRECHT 79-83 (1951). Under the English Homicide
Act 1957, see Regina v. Spriggs, [1958] 2 Weekly L.R. 162.
20. PERKINs, CRimlrNAL LAw 756-63 (1957) ; Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense
in the Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 956 (1952) ; CALIFORNIA REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 24-26.
21. Significantly, many psychiatrists, conscious of their roles as "thirteenth jurors"
(note 55 infra), welcome the compromise. See Freedman, Book Review, 76 HARv. L.
REv. 1104 (1963).
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Is there an answer? Most of those who write or speak about the problem
have tried to prove their opponents wrong. It may well be that they have all
been right: the psychiatrist with his contempt for legal formulas; the lawyer
with his distrust of medical science; and the man in the street with his sus-
picion that all this talk of lawyers and psychiatrists must ultimately endanger
our system of criminal justice.22 Would it not follow that there is something
wrong with the question? Indeed, the question of insanity put to the expert
does not differ fundamentally from the question of justice put to God in the
trial by ordeal and battle. We do not really want to know whether the accused
or condemned man is insane. By asking this unanswerable question we seek
to avoid the issue of whether or not to punish, an issue which we cannot face
until we know, until we are willing to know, why we punish. If we find, as
we shall find, that punishment is designed and imposed to serve conflicting
aims, we shall be more willing to concede that insanity as a ground for the
exclusion of punishment cannot be uniformly and consistently defined; indeed
that it cannot be defined at all except by a tautology.
In most situations in which we are called upon to define insanity, the question
being asked is obscured by the competition between such rational considera-
tions as the need for deterrence or the wish to reform, and such irrational
urges as the wish for retribution. However, at one stage in the administration
of criminal justice, the real question cloaked in the terminology of insanity
can be more readily discerned because a sole purpose of punishment can be
most nearly isolated: where the prisoner in the death cell seeks or is granted
temporary reprieve on grounds of insanity supervening his conviction.
Cat and Mouse: Stay of Execution
Henry Ford McCracken, 34, condemned Santa Ana sex murderer, has
been given six electric shock treatments of the kind usually prescribed
for insane persons .... Warden Harley 0. Teets... said that McCracken
responded favorably to them.... Dr. David G. Schmidt, chief prison psy-
chiatrist, and Dr. M. C. Wilcutts, chief prison medical officer, both [had]
testified that McCracken was sane, but suffering from a "self-induced
hypnotic condition caused by fear of his impending execution. .. ."
McCracken was morose, slovenly and full of fantasies. He imagined he
had rabbits and cats in his cell, and he made a mess in pretending to
feed them. Since the treatments, the warden said, McCracken has again
become neat in his personal habits, and he now plays the guitar and
occasionally sings.
22. When, in 1957, the experts in Washington, D.C., decided to include sociopathic
personality among mental diseases, acquittals on the ground of mental insanity in the
District of Columbia increased tenfold. Diamond, surpra note 12, at 192. LA PIERE, TE
FRE UD AN ETHIC (1959), offers what is indeed a "lay version?' (id. at 34) of psycho-
analysis as the basis of the current trend toward an expanded legal irresponsibility. See,
e.g., id. at 157-58, 160, 165, 170. For a more balanced criticism of Freud's views, see
Hall, supra note 19, at 3-4. Exclusion of habitual criminals from the new "humanitarian
treatment" by the American Law Institute reveals society's true motivation.
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Briefly, the prisoner was ready for the gas chamber and the judge so ruled. 23
This is not a parody of a medieval chronicle, or a tale of totalitarian sadism,
or a demented fantasy, but a clipping from the San Francisco Chronicle dated
San Quentin Prison, January 15, 1953.
At all times and in all countries there has apparently been agreement that
an insane person may not be executed though he was found sane and respon-
sible at the time of his deed and trial.24 In the seventeenth century Sir Edward
Coke had considerable difficulty in explaining this rule. To kill an insane man,
he felt, was "cruell and inhuman ... because by intendment of law the execu-
tion of the offender is for example... but so it is not when a mad man is
executed, but should be a miserable spectacle .... -25 Sir John Hawles, half
a century later, rightly objected that "the terror to the living is equal, whether
the person be mad or in his senses."26 Thus, explanation has sometimes been
sought in the thought that it is "against christian charity to send a great
offender quick, as it is stiled, into another world, when he is not of a capacity
to fit himself for it."2 7 More acceptable seems to have been the argument that
the killing of an insane man would deprive him of any "just defense" that
might have been available to him had he remained sane.28 Ever since Black-
stone 29 this argument has been reiterated. But it proves too much: an illiterate
"properly" executed while sane is similarly deprived of such legal remedies as
would have been available to him had he remained alive and been taught how
to read and write and think. 0
"Whatever the reason of the law is, it is plain the law is so."' 1 The insane
man in the death cell may not be executed so long as he remains insane. But
when is he insane enough to deserve the benefit of this rule-if it is a benefit?
Justice Frankfurter has said that the problems of supervening insanity "happily
do not involve" the conflict between a legal and a medical concept. 2 Is this
23. On November 6, 1953, the Supreme Court of California held in McCracken v.
Teets, 41 Cal. 2d 648, 653, 262 P.2d 561, 564 (1953), that "the stay of execution heretofore
granted is terminated."
24. For an analysis of statutory and decisional law in the United States, see Solesbee
v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 26-32 (1950).
25. CoKE, THIRD INSTITUTE, chap. 1, p. 6 (1817).
26. Sir John Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Batenan, 11 STATE
TRIALS 474, 476 (Howell ed. 1816).
27. Id. at 477.
28. Id. at 476.
29. 4 BLA cKSTONE, Comm:ENTAsiEs § 24 (Jones ed. 1916). See also 1 HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34 (1736).
30. If the possibility of a subsequently refreshed memory were enough to prevent the
execution of an insane man, it would also render unconstitutional any capital
punishment, since it is possible to speculate endlessly about the possibilities that
would rescue a condemned man from execution provided it were delayed long
enough.
Traynor, J., concurring in Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal. 2d 144, 158-59, 208 P.2d 668, 676
(1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 895 (1949).
31. HIawles, supra note 26, at 477.
32. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 8, 14 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
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really true? To be sure, we hear much less about this conflict in the proceed-
ings about the condemned man than in the controversy about the accused's
sanity. For due process does not protect the former against the governor's or
warden's verdict which merely expresses society's "merciful dispensation."33
But legally, supervening insanity is often subjected to the same test as that
applied to the accused's earlier conduct. Like the accused, the condemned man
has on occasion been said to be sane if he "knows right from wrong."3 4
Attempts are under way to introduce such rational inquiries as whether the
prisoner "is unable to confer or consult, or... to communicate knowledge of
any fact that may have a bearing on his guilt or on the mitigation of his
penalty."35 But even these current attempts at rationalizing the ancient in-
sanity rule remain burdened by such additional tests as whether the convict
"is unaware of the fact of his conviction [or] of the penalty which has been
imposed."30 Based on such tests, the rule saving the insane prisoner from
execution cannot be explained under that "official theory" which considers
reform and deterrence as the purposes of all punishment. Capital punishment
precludes "reform." And deterrence could be achieved whether or not the
offender is capable of realizing the imposition of the penalty. The rule, there-
fore, can be understood only against the background of an irrational, retribu-
tory function of punishment. Before we attempt to examine the effect of this
finding on the concept of supervening insanity, a general analysis of the pur-
poses of punishment and their relation to the insanity concept is in order.
The Stake of the Game: Why Do We Punish?
Our age prides itself with having replaced a primitive criminal law of retri-
bution by a legal order which, primarily at least, serves the purely utilitarian
purposes of reforming the criminal and deterring those inclined to commit
similar crimes. But even these two "rational" purposes allegedly governing
33. Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 407 (1897). See also Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S.
431 (1948) ; Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958); Berger v. People, 123 Colo.
403, 231 P.2d 799 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 837 (1951); Wheeler v. State, 219 Miss.
129, 70 So. 2d 82 (1954) ; Leick v. People, 140 Colo. 564, 345 P.2d 1054 (1959). But see,
e.g., Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 552 (1958), and
in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 570, 571 (1953) ; Schauer, J., dis-
senting in People v. Riley, 37 Cal. 2d 510, 519, 235 P.2d 381, 386 (1951) ; and generally,
Hazard & Louisell, supra note 8, at 396-99.
34. See, e.g., Caritativo v. Teets, 47 Cal, 2d 304, 306, 303 P.2d 339, 340 (1956), af'd,
357 U.S. 549 (1958), containing two psychiatrists' testimonies to this effect. See also
GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 436 (1952) ; RO YA. COMMISSION
oN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT 102 (1953).
35. CALIFORNIA REPORT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 58. Cf. It re Smith, 25 N.M. 48, 59,
176 Pac. 819, 823 (1918), where the question whether the convict has "a sufficient under-
standing to know any fact which might exist which would make his punishment unjust
or unlawful, and the intelligence requisite to convey such information," was at least added
to traditional tests. See also People v. Geary, 298 Ill. 236, 131 N.E. 652 (1921) ; It re
Grammer, 104 Neb. 744, 178 N.W. 624 (1920) ; Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 117
A.2d 96 (1953). See also GuTTM:AcHER & WEmoEN, op. cit. supra note 34, at 436.
36. CAuroRNIA REPORT, op. cit. mpra note 7, at 58.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
our criminal law to the exclusion of others, are often irreconcilable. "[I] f you
are to punish a man... you must injure him. If you are to reform him, you
must improve him."37 And, we may add, if we are to punish a man in order
to deter others, we may inflict any measures which will repel responsible per-
sons, without regard to his own responsibility, while, if we wish to reform
him, we must choose our course chiefly in terms of his responsibility. We
shall, in the first case, be inclined to define insanity as a defense narrowly so
as to permit imposition of punishment in as many cases as possible. Gang
crimes, from petty thievery to homicides, are perhaps the most obvious ex-
amples. And, in the second case, we shall draw our definition broadly to avoid
the imposition of ineffective punitive measures. Certain sex crimes at certain
times in certain communities offer rare instances of this latter type.
If the relevance and thus the definition of insanity must vary even under
our two official theories of punishment, this relevance and definition become
multifarious if we admit, as we must, that a third function of punishment, the
satisfaction of the ancient urges of retribution, has always remained with us.
We have isolated the insanity problem regarding the prisoner in the death
cell because as to him theories of reformation and deterrence are clearly mean-
ingless; retribution is left as the sole determinant of his treatment. But the
retributory function of criminal law pervades its entire administration. Indeed,
those very crimes with which the public is most concerned are those as to
which this function is clearly predominant, i.e., the crimes of homicide. Those
who wish to know do know that both deterrence and reformation matter little
to one about to commit a passion murder.38 Those who wish to know do know
that punishment of the murderer, far from serving the official doctrines of
deterrence and reformation, follows prevailingly those irrational impulses which
we usually call retributory.3 9
Whether insanity is invoked at trial or in the death cell, these impulses
react to the plea differently than the desire for deterrence or reformation;
moreover, the retributory reaction itself may differ according to the prevalence
of one of the various facets of retribution. A comprehensive analytical study
revealing the many and complex facets of the urge for retribution is still lack-
37. SHAw, THE CRIME OF IMPRISONMENT 10 (1924). See also Frym, Past and Future
of Criminal Rehabilitation, 3 J. PUB. L. 451, 453 (1954); Waelder, Psychiatry and the
Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 386 (1952).
38. See, e.g., Watson, A Critique of the Legal Approach to Crime and Correction,
23 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 611, 619-20 (1958); WOLFGAxG, PATTERNS IN CRnMAL
HOICImE 203-21 (1958). On the victim-offender relationship see Dession, Justice after
Conviction, 25 CON . B.J. 215, 223 (1951) ; REIwALD, SocITY AND ITS CRImALs 170-
72 (1950) ; KOESTLER, REFLECTIONiS oN HANGING 48-61 (1957). On the need for a general
psychoanalytical approach to law, see Schoenfeld, Law and Unconscious Motivation, 8
How. L.J. 15 (1962).
39. "Many policies set forth in the name of deterrence appear to be social rationaliza-
tions in the service of retributive impulses." Watson, supra note 38, at 621. On the mean-
ing of retribution, see, e.g., De Grazia, Crime without Punishment: A Psychiatric Conun-
drum, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 746, 755 (1952) ; Kaplan, Barriers to the Establishment of a
Deterministic Criminal Law, 46 Ky. L.J. 103 (1957); ZILBooRG, THE PSYCHOLOGY oF
THE CMINAL AcT AND PUMS'HMMNT 69-88 (1954).
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ing. However, three of these facets are particularly important and immediately
apparent. We need retribution as an outlet for that "moralized aggression"
which elsewhere is met in moral condemnation or in the enjoyment of trials
and executions.4 0 We need retribution as "revenge" for harm done to us to
help us bear the blow.4 1 And most important, we need retribution to counter-
act our own temptations. We must prove to ourselves that crimes which we
may have wanted or may yet want to commit "do not pay." Insofar as these
wishes are conscious, the function of retribution is at least partly analogous
to the rational objective of deterring others. But that function appears wholly
irrational as a demand for "atonement," where, as is usually the case as to
homicide, our wishes remain subconscious.
Each one of these facets of retribution may engender a different attitude
toward the insane criminal. We may assume that the exercise of aggression or
vengeance was not at first related to the "guilt" of the victim,42 and that this
accounts for the practice of mechanical talion prevailing in all earlier legal
systems, a practice which condoned the lunatic's punishment as that of the
devil inhabiting him.43 It was deeper understanding of human psychology that
induced kings, judges, and juries, first as a matter of grace, then as a matter
of the accused's right, partly at least to repress the retributory urge against
the guiltless. But we are far from having completed that repression, and
retribution will probably always remain with us in its third and most important
form--our need for atonement. There have been many dialectic and moral
explanations of this need.44 Modem psychology has helped us to be franker
with ourselves.
[T]he failure to punish an offender means to us a threat to our own
repressive trends .... [i]n the case of every violation of the law, our
40. REiwALD, op. cit. supra note 38, at 206, 246-61; FLUGEL, MAN, M RALS AND
SocIETY 169 (1947); BERGLER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 130, 141. Repression of such
aggression creates anxiety. Money-Kyrle, Psycho-analysis and Philosophy, in PsYcHo-
ANALYsIs AND CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT 102, 110 (Sutherland ed. 1958). Resulting uncon-
scious guilt "remains a secret motive for a demand for scapegoats." Id. at 111. See also
generally Bienenfeld, Justice, Aggression, and Eros, 38 INT. J. PSYCHOAN. 1 (1957).
41. 1 SIMPsoN & STONE, LAw AND SocIETr 132 (1948). "When the Areiopagos pro-
nounced a capital sentence on a murderer it was carried out by the public executioner in
the presence of the relatives of the deceased." 2 VNOGRODOFF, HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE
180 (1922).
42. Although it may be more accurate psychologically and historically to conceive of
early "liability without fault" as a liability based on an irrebuttable presumption of fault.
See Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 855 (1953).
43. Guttmacher & Weihofen, supra note 3, at 380.
44. See generally BELING, DIE VERGELTUNGSIDEE (1908), with an analysis of Kant's
categorical imperative. To others "the idea of punishment in its essence and value pre-
supposes indispensably the idea of God ... so that in an atheist system punishment has
no function... ." HILDEBRAND, ZUM WEsENi DER STRAFE 71 (1932). On Hegel's concep-
tion of "punishment as only the manifestation, the second half of crime," see, e.g., SEN,
FROM PUNISHMENT TO PREVENTION 19 (1932). The use of the term "atonement" is bur-
dened by our own moral or theological reverence. But no neutral substitute seems avail-
able.
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Ego makes an appeal for the atonement of the transgression; it does this
in order to enforce the opposition of the Superego against the pressure of
its instincts. 45
None of the current tests of sanity does, in any way, respond to this predom-
inant motivation of our punitive practices. If it were possible to obtain an
answer to the question whether the accused knew right and wrong, and thus
defied society on an intellectual level, or the question whether he was free
from a causative mental disease, and thus defied society on an emotional level
(presence of guilt feelings), those answers would relate to our urge for atone-
ment only in so far as those factors happened to play a part in our identifica-
tion with the criminal. And, accordingly, our definition of legal insanity would
have to vary with the basis and intensity of this identification, from crime to
crime.46
[T]he greater the pressure coming from repressed impulses, the more
aware becomes the Ego that it needs the institution of punishment as an
intimidating example, acting against one's own primitive world of re-
pressed instinctual desires .... In other words, the louder man calls for
the punishment of the lawbreaker, the less he has to fight against his own
repressed impulses.47
And, we might add, the stronger our own inhibitions against the commission
of a particular crime, the less insistent we will be on seeing the lawbreaker
punished for our own satisfaction, the more willing we will be to permit his
treatment on a genuinely curative basis after his acquittal on grounds of in-
sanity.
Earliest and therefore strongest repression is implanted against the child's
Oedipus wish to kill one parent and to commit incest with the other. So strong
is this repression that our own temptation remains totally subconscious and
we are inclined to assume insanity where the temptation is overcome in mur-
der or incest. We do not need the offender's punishment to refrain from these
crimes ourselves-if we should ever feel compelled to commit them, such
punishment would not deter us. Where we nevertheless impose a penalty of
death or imprisonment, we do so because of remaining retributory urges of
aggression and vengeance. A plea of insanity that is to prevail against these
urges must be made to respond to their function: only he is insane whose
punishment fails to offer society the satisfaction of aggression or vengeance.
Next in time in the child's early education is the repression of sexual satis-
factions other than incest. Occurring at a more advanced age and being there-
45. ALEXANDER & STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC 214-15 (rev.
ed. 1956). See also BERGLER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 134. Freud, Dostojevski und die
Vatert3tung, 12 GES. SCH='TEN 7, 22 (1934), stresses our feeling of gratitude for the
atoning murderers. "One need not kill oneself now he has killed .... ." For a genealogy of
the guilt complex, see RExI, MYTH AND GuirT (1957), particularly 216-17.
46. See Andenaes, General Prevention--Illusion or Reality, 43 J. CRIM. LAW, CRM-
iNOL. & POLICE SCIENCE 176, 182 (1952) : "Psychological attitudes vary markedly in the
different categories of law breaking ... it should be . . . obvious that a study of the
general-preventive effect of punishment must also be differentiated."
47. ALMXANDER & STAUB, Op. cit. supra note 45, at 215.
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fore less effective than the repression of murder and incest, this later repres-
sion leaves us subject to temptation all through our lives. Insofar as this
temptation remains subconscious owing to the intensity of repression (as with
respect to most perversions), the urge for punishment will, almost as easily
as in the case of murder and incest, yield to pleas of insanity. But where the
temptation, owing to a less effective repression (as with regard to "forbidden"
normal sexual relations), reaches the surface of our minds, we need the
punishment of those who have succumbed; we become unwilling to concede
to them an irresponsibility in which we ourselves would have liked to indulge.
The relation between time and intensity of repression, on the one hand,
and the effect and meaning of the defense of legal insanity, on the other hand,
becomes quite obvious as we reach lesser types of criminal behavior. Property
crimes are last to be prohibited in the child's education and our temptations
to commit such crimes, typically, remain wholly conscious. Here, with little
or no concern for the offender's motivation, we demand his punishment to
deter ourselves and others. A plea of "insanity" 4 will be rarely successful ex-
cept where, as in the case of pyro- or kleptomania, the property crime is tinged
with (lower level) perversity. And the same is true a fortiori with respect to
that group of crimes exemplified by violation of police regulations. "Here
nearly all of us are potential criminals" 49 and unwilling to forego punishment
of the law-breaker under any circumstances. In summary, the insanity plea will
quite generally fail where, as in the case of gang crimes, punishment is deter-
mined prevailingly or exclusively by the purely rational aim of general deter-
rence.
Where retribution enters, we have seen, the defense of insanity is most likely
to succeed, because insanity takes on its broadest meaning, where the retribu-
tory urge is one primarily determined by a desire for atonement to counteract
subconscious temptations and those temptations are securely repressed. Be it un-
der M'Naghten, Durham or Currens, the passion murderer has a better than
even chance to escape punishment as having been insane when committing a
crime that we consciously do not wish to copy. In contrast, the plea of insanity
will usually fail as to those crimes where punishment is a function of a retribu-
tory urge grounded in our conscious temptations. M'Naghten will quite effec-
tively assist the trier of facts in finding the thief or rapist sane and ready to go to
his reward. Finally, the plea of insanity is wholly unavailing as to those crimes
where punishment acts as an outlet for a retributory urge of aggression or
vengeance. Here none of our current or conceivable formulas for the definition
48. "[I]nsanity as a defence is an exception in crimes other than murder, and almost
the rule where murder is concerned." KOESTLER, REFLEcTio Ns ON HANGING 70 (1957).
Significantly, no discussion of insanity is found in HALL, THaEFT, LAW AND SocIr (2d
ed. 1952). For an illustrative burglary case see Rogers v. State, 222 Miss. 690, 76 So. 2d
831 (1955).
49. Andenaes, supra note 46, at 182. On transitional types of crimes, only partly re-
strained by "non-legal social taboos," such as tax cheating or gambling, see Dession, Mipra
note 38, at 224-25.
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of insanity will and should induce the jury to deprive society of its primitive
satisfaction. The mass murderer and sex "fiend" will go to his death however
"insane" he may have been at the time of his act, trial or execution. Where
aggression or vengeance are thus involved, we must be on our guard when
"humanitarians" 50 attempt to expand the defense of insanity by a progressive
identification of crime and sickness. They are asking society to forego its
primitive satisfactions and may thus open the door to new expressions of
powerful urges. "For if crime and disease are to be regarded as the same
thing, it follows that any state of mind which our masters choose to call
'disease' can be treated as crime; and compulsorily cured." 51 Indeed, now that
Durham has shown its ugly face threatening indeterminate commitment of the
"innocent," the accused has come to shun the "mercy" of a finding of insanity.
We should not "be deceived by those humane pretensions which have served
to usher in every cruelty of the revolutionary period in which we live."' 2
When the California Adult Authority replaced the judge by a board of "ex-
perts" to have the convict sentenced according to his needs rather than his
deeds, the mercy of a determinate sentence, however severe, was replaced by
the cruelty of an indeterminate sentence, however mild.53 "Naturam expellas
furca, tamen usque recurret."54
Even if we could and were willing to isolate the predominant purposes of
punishment in each case, our expert would fail us where we need him most.
He could perhaps, in a procedure permitting such expertise (as perhaps in
juvenile delinquency cases), tell us that a particular case required a finding
of insanity because the prescribed penalty would not reform the offender, or
a finding of sanity because the prescribed penalty would be effective. Our
expert might even be able to tell us in another case in which we are primarily
concerned with general deterrence (e.g., the case of a gang murderer or thief)
that from his knowledge of social psychology a finding of insanity would be
inadvisable because deterrence could be expected without regard to the ac-
cused's state of mind. But once retribution enters, and it nearly always does
where the expert is now consulted, his task becomes hopeless. He would have
to make his finding depend not on his professional evaluation of the actual or
potential criminal, but on his own theory as to society's likely reaction to an
acquittal-a forfeiture of subconscious urges of aggression and revenge or of
50. See, e.g., RocHE, THE CRIaMN. MIND (1958). Cf. Goldstein & Katz, Abolish
the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963); Impromptu Remarks,
Fried, 76 HA v. L. REv. 1319 (1963); Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach
to Crime and Correction, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 650 (1958).
51. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 REs JuDICATAE 224, 225
(1953). See also Waelder, supra note 37.
52. Lewis, supra note 51, at 230. See Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir.
1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
53. See Pfersich, Strafzumessung im Lichte der modernen amerikanischen Schile, 17
REcHTSVERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR GESAISTEN STRAFRECHTSIVISSENSCHAFT
(1956). See also Hall, supra note 19, at 4-6.
54. 2 Horatius Flaccus (ed. Orellius 1844) Epistolarum liber primus, epist. X, 24.
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the retributory need to counteract temptation. But we certainly are not willing
now and never should be willing in the future to entrust such judgments to
the psychiatrist. Only the jury, which for this reason will remain indispensable,
can be hoped to interpret for us society's subconscious needs. And the best
we can expect from the expert is that he will consciously and conscientiously
attempt to act as a thirteenth juror.r5
Much patient research will yet have to be done so as to make such tentative
findings fruitful for the treatment of legal insanity's irrational foundations.
But perhaps the principle and direction of these findings can be made more
readily acceptable if we recall that situation in which they seem self-evident
because of the absence of any rational byplay, namely the case of "superven-
ing" insanity of the man in the death cell.
The Mouse: Toy or Sacrifice
This much is certain: we can use neither M'Naghten nor Currens, neither
a right and wrong test nor a "product" test, to determine supervening in-
sanity. To be sure, we may be tempted to do so by a desire, conscious or sub-
conscious, to remedy extrajudicially an obvious miscarriage of justice against
one insane at the time of his deed. But other means are available for this
purpose. If we are truly concerned only with testing the supervening insanity
of a man sane at the time of his crime, neither M'Naghten nor Currens can
be of help, but only a formula which takes account of the purpose of our rule
against the execution of one who turned insane in the death cell. There is
much to be said for the distressing conclusion that since the decision to post-
pone an offender's execution cannot stem from the objectives of reform or
rational deterrence, reluctance to execute an insane man is based on no nobler
and more humane feeling than our lack of retributory satisfaction.56 This lack
may be due to our feeling that the lunatic is beyond the grasp of mankind or
sufficiently punished by God or Devil, 57 or simply to the absence of the vic-
tor's primitive enjoyment of his victory.58 A Mississippi court has reasoned,
with disarming frankness, that the insane man in the death cell has "lost aware-
ness of his precarious situation," and that therefore "amid the darkened mists
55. See Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 182,
194 (1958). See also Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Deter-
mination of Incompetency: A Sceptical Inquiry into the Courtroom Functions of Psy-
chiatrists, 14 SYRAcusE L. REv. 564 (1963) ; Scher, Expertise and the Post Hoc Judgment
of Insanity or the Autognosticia, and the Law, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 4 (1962).
56. Thus we may probably explain also the law's insistence on confession and repent-
ance. See, e.g., ALEXANDRM & STAUB, op. cit. supra note 45, at 216. For a side-glance at
the basic rationale of capital punishment, compare the treatment accorded the body of a
condemned man who deprives society of retributory satisfaction by suicide. 1 RADziNowicz,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRi=AL LAW 197 (1948).
57. See Scher, supra note 55, at 5.
58. Where more rationalistic policies underlie the prosecution, as in the case of
treason, early law expressly includes the insane in its sanctions. The person "attainted
and convicted of high treason" was subject to execution sane or insane. 33 Hen. 8, c. 20,
iI.
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of mental collapse, there is no light against which the shadows of death may
be cast. It is revealed that if he were taken to the electric chair, he would not
quail....
We do not seem to be prepared to accept any one of these "rationalizations."
If, on the other hand, we were able to agree with the often repeated assertion
that the rule aims at giving the condemned man his last chance to say his prayer
or to prove his innocence, our test would have to be whether the symptoms of
insanity do actually deprive the prisoner of his chance. And this would have
absolutely nothing to do with whether he can distinguish right from wrong,
whether he can act according to this knowledge, or whether he suffers from a
mental disease; or with any other formulation of the insanity test devised for the
determination of criminal responsibility.60 But as we have seen, treatment by
the "last-chance" rationale must be rejected on other grounds,6 1 and in any
event, electric shock to restore a state of sanity, however defined, can produce
nothing but a distressing travesty of justice. Perhaps we shall learn either to
be truthful enough to abolish the defense of supervening insanity altogether
and send the condemned to the chair, be he sane or insane, or to be courageous
enough to do away with a law of capital punishment 62 devised to let us watch
a fellow human "quail" before his executioner.
To sum up: Like insanity in the death cell, legal insanity in general must
be related to the underlying issue. Thus, in trying to define that concept we
must not replace the quasi-moral, quasi-legal, quasi-medical formulas of the
M'Naghten rule which force relevant answers (punishment or release) to un-
answerable questions (knowledge of right and wrong),63 by new quasi-moral,
quasi-legal, quasi-medical formulas which induce irrelevant answers ("irre-
sponsibility" on medical grounds) to answerable questions (causation by men-
59. Musselwhite v. State, 215 Miss. 363, 367, 60 So. 2d 807, 809 (1952).
60. See supra note 35.
61. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
62. See WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 146-70 (1956). Most other countries have
chosen this solution. JoYcE, CAPIAL PUNISHMENT: A WORLD ViEv (1961). See KoEsT-
Lm, op. cit. supra note 48, at 54, 171. For a history of capital punishment in England,
see RADziNowicz, op. cit. supra note 56, at 611 passim. See generally Cardiner & Curtis-
Raleigh, The Judicial Attitude to Penal Reform, 65 L.Q. Rxv. 196 (1949); Sellin-,---or-
rection in Historical Perspective, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 585, 586-88 (1958).
63. See Mueller, M'Naghten Remains Irreplaceable: Recent Events in the Law of
Incapacity, 50 GEo. L.J. 105 (1961). See also HALL, op. cit. supra note 11, at 500-
18; Weintraub, Criminal Responsibility: Psychiatry Alone Cannot Determine It, 49
A.B.A.J. 1075 (1963); Cavanagh, Problems of a Psychiatrist on Operating under the
M'Naghten, Durham and Model Penal Code Rules, 45 MARX2. L. REv. 478 (1962) ; Ward,
The M'Naghten Rule: A Re-evaluation, 45 MARQ. L. REV. 506 (1962); CALIFOR'A
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 63 (dissenting opinion) ; CANADIAN ROYAL CoMMIssION
ON THE LAW OF INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL CASES, REPORT (1956). For an
unusual attempt at defending M'Naghten on the basis of Protestant Ethics, see LA PiERE,
THE FREUDIAN ETHIC 176 (1962).
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tal disease or ability to conform). Rather, following the purpose of the insanity
test, the definition of legal insanity must vary from crime to crime--in the
same manner as it varies in other fields of the law-according to the purpose
for which the concept is used. If one may be sane for the purpose of executing
a valid will and yet be insane enough to supply his spouse with a ground for
divorce-one may be sane to deserve punishment as a thief and yet be insane
enough not to be "responsible" for a passion murder. Concern with punish-
ment as a deterrent prevails with regard to property and gang crimes suffi-
ciently to diminish our interest in the thief's or the gangster's motivation. But
with regard to most homicides, need for punishment is predominantly deter-
mined by our retributory urge which in the case of a killing committed in
passion (in contrast to a gang murder) recedes with our own subconscious
temptation to kill likewise.
If thus the varying purpose of punishment is revealed as the true deter-
minant in our search for the definition of legal insanity, none of the pre-
vailing or suggested formulas can produce a general answer. Our defini-
tion would have to follow our sole concern about whether and how the de-
fendant ought to be punished, and would have to vary from crime to crime,
as it varies at every stage of the criminal process from deed to execution. But
since we do not know why we punish, we conceal an irrational search in a
pseudo-rational question which cannot be one for medical science to solve. If
we nevertheless insist on shifting the responsibility for a necessarily irrational
decision to the psychiatrist, that "expert" can have no other function than that
of a thirteenth juror. Unaided by his professional knowledge he must ultimate-
ly follow his emotions as an individual member of society and speak his "sane"
or "insane." his "guilty" or "non-guilty," according to whether or not he
feels that, on grounds unexpressed and inexpressible, the accused should be
punished. And this decision is far less concerned with the defendant than with
the reaction of society: will the public rightly or wrongly expect his punish-
ment to deter other potential criminals, or, discounting this quasi-rational test,
will the public be willing to forego retributory satisfaction without elsewhere
and elsewhen taking a grimmer toll? Law and psychiatry will continue to
share the blame and the shame. And they will do so, to complete Professor
Glueck's apt metaphor,64 neither in cold war nor in entente cordiale, but in
uneasy coexistence-until, in utopia, both the creed and the need of punish-
ment have been forgotten.
64. GLuEcK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: CoLD WAR OR ENTENTE CORDIAME? (1962).
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